The FCC’s proposed reforms to cable licensing procedures would formalise the US Government's recent yet unofficial efforts to exclude Chinese firms from subsea projects
The FCC is revamping its approach to subsea cables in line with President Trump’s efforts to link economic security to national security
On 16 July 2025, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) published a proposal to modify its licensing rules for subsea cable routes landing in the US. The set of proposals are split between a Report and Order, which will become immediately applicable when adopted by the regulator, and a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM), which is a continuing consultation on additional changes under consideration. Read together, the FCC’s proposed changes aim to tighten restrictions on firms from countries deemed “foreign adversaries” (particularly China) in supplying, building and operating cable routes while facilitating more streamlined licence approval processes for US cable suppliers and owners. In his statement on the proposals, Brendan Carr (Chair, FCC) described the changes as action to support Donald Trump’s (President, US) assertion that “economic security is national security”. Both the Report and Order and the FNPRM are scheduled to be discussed and voted on during the regulator’s open meeting on 7 August 2025.
The regulator is seeking further comment on requirements to remove Chinese equipment from subsea routes
Through modifications to the terms for licensing cables, the FCC aims to prohibit the participation of Chinese firms seeking to supply, invest in or buy capacity from cable projects with a US landing station. While the proposed rules apply to firms subject to the jurisdiction of any foreign adversary, Carr specifically referenced the growing influence of Chinese firms, including telecoms operators such as China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom, as well as the supply firm HMN Tech, formerly Huawei Marine. Among the rules to be adopted in the Report and Order are policies outlining the presumed denial of any application for cable landing licences filed by these firms, as well as licences for routes with additional landing stations in a country designated as a foreign adversary. The FCC is likely to approve a further consultation on presumptively denying the applications of cable projects that are contracted with covered supply firms, namely HMN Tech. In that consultation, the regulator will also seek comment on requiring cable operators to remove any equipment used in existing routes that was supplied by HMN Tech within a given time frame. The FCC has initially proposed that transition period as five years, largely mirroring that approach to vendor restrictions in 5G networks enforced against Huawei, ZTE and other untrusted suppliers in the US and 27 other jurisdictions around the world. While major US cable owners, which are increasingly represented by big tech platforms such as Google, Microsoft and Amazon, have contracted on co-ownership and capacity purchasing with Chinese operators in the past, HMN Tech has notably never acted as the supplier on any US tech-backed cable project.
US cable firms are also likely to see expedited licensing processes and active efforts to encourage adoption of US equipment abroad
Beyond restricting access for Chinese firms, the FCC is also seeking to ease regulatory burdens in the licensing process for US firms while maintaining a high-level of security clearance for new projects. The regulator is weighing offering expedited regulatory review to firms willing to make a series of national security guarantees, allowing projects to bypass the usual referral process via the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector, commonly referred to as Team Telecom. To qualify, firms would need to be recurring applicants (i.e. already own and operate a licensed cable landing in the US) in good standing with the FCC and would have to attest to additional security precautions, including:
Advanced cybersecurity practices, such as adoption of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework;
Advanced physical security standards, such as added perimeter security, physical barriers and surveillance equipment; and
Agreements to avoid entering capacity buying, co-ownership, equipment supply and repair and maintenance contracts with firms from foreign adversaries.
The FCC is also asking for comment on how to incentivise the adoption of “trusted” technologies in subsea cable projects domestically and abroad, seeking to advance the broader governmental aim to “distribute the American tech stack around the world”. The regulator is considering a prioritisation scheme for licensing projects that adopt and use technologies produced and provided by the US and its allies, such as contracting for supply with SubCom, ASN of France or NEC of Japan. While the US Government has been successful in recent years in advocating informally the exclusion of Chinese equipment in subsea infrastructure, and therefore the increased adoption of US and allied equipment, the FCC’s proposal would seek to formalise these policies in alignment with the EC’s ongoing consideration of a “security toolbox” for subsea cables that is also likely to include some form of vendor restrictions. Unlike the EU, however, where public funding has also been proposed as a tool to boost the development of European infrastructure, the FCC appears to assume that the rapid growth of private subsea cable investment from domestic tech firms paired with a scaled back regulatory approach can be effective in expanding US influence without the need to commit public money.
